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Abstract
An algorithm for computing Dynamic Nash Equilibria (DNE) in an extended ver-
sion of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) (hereafter KW) is proposed. The algorithm com-
putes the equilibrium prole of (pure) strategies and the evolution of the distribution
of three types of assets across three types of individuals.
It has two features that together make it applicable in a wide range of macroeco-
nomic experiments: (i) it works for any feasible initial distribution of assets; (ii) it
allows for multiple switches of trading strategies along the transitional dynamics.
The algorithm is used to study the relationship between liquidity, production, and
inequality in income and in welfare, in economies where assets fetch di¤erent returns
and agents have heterogeneous skills and preferences.
One experiment shows a case of reversal of fortune. An economy endowed with a
low-return asset takes over a similar economy endowed with a high-return asset because,
in the former economy, a group of agents abandon a rent-seeking trading behavior and
increase their income by trading and producing more intensively. A second experiment
shows that a reduction of market frictions leads both to higher income and lower
inequality. Other experiments evaluate the propagation mechanism of shocks that hit
the assetsreturns.
A key result is that trade and liquidity tend to squeeze income inequality.
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1 Introduction
A method for computing dynamic equilibria in a model with genuine heterogenous agents
that trade in decentralized markets, as exemplied in Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) (hereafter
KW), is proposed. Although the original KWmodel has been enriched and simplied in many
ways (see Lagos et al., 2014) the implications of its dynamics with respect to the movement
of aggregate variables, such as consumption, assets, production, and income inequality, have
not been investigated.
Most of the dynamic general equilibrium theory is based on the idea that individuals
trade their goods and services in centralized markets. By assuming that agents trade with
each other, the KW types of models o¤er an alternative view of how macroeconomic phe-
nomena emerge from individual interactions. A prominent feature of this approach is that
the links between the behavior of the macroeconomic series and micro-level decisions are
more articulated than in Walrasian models.
Performing macroeconomic experiments in decentralized market economies has been elu-
sive, especially when agents are allowed to carry assets over time. The main di¢ culty is that
the evolution of the assets and the trajectories of trading decisions are intertwined and multi-
dimensional. This paper demonstrates that dynamic equilibria can be obtained numerically,
despite the fact that agents always trade with each other and that their optimal decisions
incorporate information on future distribution of traded assets. It complements the work of
Molico (2006), and Molico and Chiu (2010, 2011) who studied macroeconomic aggregates
in decentralized settings combining analytic and computational methods. Although similar
in spirit, the present study emphasizes the role of the liquidity of real assets1 rather than
that of at money, and deals with the evolution over time of the distribution of wealth in
transitional dynamics rather than in the steady state.
The proposed algorithm computes the evolution of the distribution of assets and the
prole of trading strategies in separate steps, according to an iterative guess procedure. One
important feature of the algorithm is that it does not require any ad-hoc assumptions on the
agentsability to process or access to information: agents are rational, forward-looking, with
full knowledge of the distribution of assets and of the trading strategies of other individuals.2
The main result is that, despite the lack of competitive markets, equilibria can be computed
1There is growing consensus that real assets play an important role in facilitating trade (see section 10
of Lagos et al. (2014) and citations therein).
2Matsuyama et al. (1993), Wright (1995), Luo (1999) and Sethi (1999) search for equilibria in a similar
environment using evolutionary dynamics. Marimon et al. (1990) and Basç¬(1999) explore how articially-
intelligent agents can learn to play equilibrium in the model. Brown (1996) and Du¤y and Ochs (1999),
Du¤y (2001), and Du¤y and Ochs (2002) in a number of laboratory experiments, ask the extent to which
agents adopt "speculative" strategies when the theory indicates these should prevail.
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in all interesting parametrizations of the economy.
The algorithm builds directly on the concept of (open loop) Nash equilibrium. The
computational task is to calculate the law of motion for the distribution of di¤erent types of
assets, across heterogenous individuals, and to determine the best response of each individual.
Because the focus is on pure strategies3 and goods are not divisible, there is a nite number
of choices and the distribution of assets is discrete.4 Therefore, at each point in time, the
state of the economy and agentschoices are represented by a nite-dimensional vector.
A key methodological insight is that optimal trading strategies can be determined by in-
tegrating backward in time the value functions (in di¤erences), starting from a neighborhood
of the steady state. The information about the potential gains in deviating from the prede-
termined prole of strategies is then used in the following iteration when a new time-pattern
of the wealth distribution is calculated. In particular, each round of the iterative scheme
consists of two steps. In a rst step, given the initial state of the economy, a time-pattern of
the asset distribution is derived from the outcome of decentralized meetings. In the second
step, the algorithm veries whether any agent has an incentive to deviate from such prole
of strategies. The algorithm is able to uncover patterns in which one or more types of agents
switch trading strategies.
Because the algorithm works for any feasible initial state, it gives ample freedom in
designing macroeconomic experiments whose results are interesting on their own. A rst
experiment parallels the development of two similar economies that di¤er only for the rate of
return of one type of assets. Starting from the same initial position, the high-return economy
is taken over by the other economy. The reversal occurs because in the low-return economy a
group of agents abandon a rent-seeking trading behavior, and instead prefer to increase their
income by trading and producing more intensively. A second experiment reveals that an
amelioration of market frictions leads to a more equitable distribution of income, as assets
become more liquid. Additional experiments put at the center stage of the analysis the
heterogeneity of skills and assets in interpreting the propagation mechanism of shocks that
hit the returns of assets.
A common theme of all experiments is the relationship between income and welfare
inequality and liquidity. There are two main reasons for inequality: (i) assets fetch di¤erent
returns but every individual is allowed to carry only one type of asset at a time; (ii) assets
3For a discussion of mixed strategies in a similar environment see Kehoe et al. (1993) and Renero (1998).
4The KW dynamics are not directly comparable to the ones generated in Trejos and Wright (1995), where
the key evolving variable is the value of at money, nor to the ones based on Lagos and Wright (2005) where
the dynamics are only over two periods. They are also quite di¤erent from those in Boldrin, Kiyotaki, and
Wright (1993) where the only state variable is the share of the population engaged in production or in trade
activity but there are no storable assets.
3
di¤er in their degree of liquidity. Although individuals have equal opportunities in accessing
the decentralized market, the odds that a match leads to the maximum gain (which comes
by acquiring the consumption goods) varies both across individuals and across time. One
question that will be explored then is how liquidity can squeeze or magnify inequality. A
general pattern that emerges is that when a shock induces some agents to play speculative
strategies, income inequality shrinks because more frequent market interactions tend to
correct inequality due to the variance of returns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briey describes the eco-
nomic environment, illustrates the evolution of the distribution of inventories under a given
prole of strategies, and denes the best response functions of three types of representative
agents. The section that follows, studies the properties of the dynamical system and details
the numerical algorithm. Section (4) denes macroeconomic indicators. Section (5) proposes
four macroeconomic experiments (two more are in the Appendix): One illustrates a case of
fortune reversal between two economies. A second one follows the responses to a shock that
improves the matching rate. A third experiment studies the uctuations in liquidity and
production caused by a shock to one of the assetsrates of return. The last experiment deals
with multiple switches. Section (6) summarizes the results and suggests further applications
of the algorithm.
2 The Model Economy
There are only minor di¤erences with respect to the decentralized economy described in
KW: time is continuous; the ranking on the returns across assets is allowed to change; and
agents are not necessarily equally distributed across types. A brief description follows. The
economy is populated by three types of individuals, denoted by 1; 2; and 3. There is a
large number of agents of each type, Ni, for i = 1; 2; 3. The overall size of the population
is N . The fraction of each type is i = Ni=N . People live forever. An agent of type i
derives utility exclusively from consuming good i and can produce only good i + 1 (mod.
3). Production takes place immediately after consumption. Agent is5 instantaneous utility
from consumption and the disutility of producing good i + 1 are denoted by Ui and Di,
respectively, and their di¤erence is ui = Ui   Di. There is a capacity constraint. At each
instant of time an individual can hold only one unit of some storable good i that o¤ers an
instantaneous return ri, measured in units of utility (the terms good, commodity, inventory,
and asset will be used interchangeably). The return of good i is the same for all agents of
5When no confusion arises, I will use the loose language of calling an agent of type i simply as agent or
individual i.
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any type. The discount rate is denoted by  > 0.
A pair of agents is randomly and uniformly chosen from the population to meet for a
possible trade. After a pair is formed, the waiting time for the next pair to be called is
governed by a Poisson process with intensity . This implies that the probability that an
agent is called for a (rst) match before time t is 1   e t. A meeting does not necessarily
mean that the two parties trade. A bilateral trade occurs if and only if it is mutually
agreeable. If both agents want what the other has, they swap goods. Otherwise, they part
company and keep the same good in the inventory as they wait for the next call. Agent
i always accepts good i. Furthermore, because agent i consumes his consumption good
immediately upon reception, she never carries good i. Therefore, agent i always enters the
market either with one unit of good i+ 1, or with one unit of good i+ 2.
The proportion of type i agents that hold good j at time t is denoted by pi;j(t). Then,
the vector ~p(t) = fpi;j(t)g for i = 1; 2; 3 and j = 1; 2; 3 describes the state of the economy
at time t (from now on, it is understood that i and j go from 1 to 3). But since pi;i(t) = 0,
pi;i+1(t) + pi;i+2(t) = i: (1)
for any t > 0, the state of the economy can be represented in a more parsimonious way by
p(t) = fp1;2(t); p2;3(t); p3;1(t)g. To simplify the notation, sometimes pi;i+1becomes pi. An
individual i has only to decide whether to exchange his production good for the other type
of good. Agent is choice in favor of indirect trade is denoted with  i(t) = 1 and against it
with  i(t) = 0. Agent i has to select a time path  i(t) that maximizes her expected stream
of present and future net utility, given other agentspaths of strategies, (t) = [1(t), 2(t),
3(t)], and p(t), for any t > 0.
2.1 Distribution of Inventories and Value Functions
For a given prole of strategies (t), the evolution in the stock of good i+ 1 held by agents
of type i is given by6
_pi;i+1 = fpi;i+2[pi+1;i(1  i+1) + pi+2;i + pi+2;i+1(1  i)]  pi;i+1[pi+1;i+2i]g: (2)
The terms inside the brackets before the minus sign calculate the probability that a type i
agent is called for a match while holding good i+ 2, and ends up in the position of carrying
good i+1. Such an event materializes either because of barter or because the agent leaves the
meeting with good i; consumes it, and then immediately produces good i+1. The following
expression accounts for the probability that an agent of type i who holds good i+1 ends up
6Du¢ e and Sun (2012) show that in a similar matching environment frequency coincides with probability.
See in particular their Theorem 1.
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with good i + 2. The behavior of pi;i+2 is derived through (1). The ensemble of the system
that describes the evolution of the inventoriesdistribution is denoted by F (p(t)).
Consider now a representative agent of type i that has to compute her best prole of
strategies, given a pattern of inventories p(t) and a pattern of strategies for other agents
(t) including those of her own type. Let Vi;j(t) be value function when carrying good j
at time t. When j = i+ 1, we have that
Vi;i+1(t) = maxf i(s)gst
Z 1
t
e (s t)fe r(s t)([pi;i+2 i(1  i) + pi+1;i+2 i]Vi;i+2+ (3)
+ [1  pi;i+2 i(1  i)  pi+1;i+2 i]Vi;i+1 + [pi+1;i + pi+2;ii+2]ui)+
+
1  e (s t)r
r
ri+1gds;
where the term e (s t)ds measures the probability that an agent of type i is called to form
a match for the rst time after time t in the time interval (s; s + ds). The term after the
discount factor is the probability that this agent goes through indirect trading in which
case, she is left with Vi;i+2 as continuation value. Else, she ends up with good i + 1 either
because no trade takes place or because she acquired her consumption good an event that
occurs with probability pi+1;i + pi+2;ii+2 and then produces good i + 1. The last term
is the return for holding the asset i + 1 from time t to time s. An additional equation for
Vi;i+2(t), reported in the Appendix, completes the description of the optimization problem.
Let i(s)  Vi;i+1(s)   Vi;i+2(s), and let ~ i(s;(s);p(s)) denote the optimal (or best)
response prole of strategies of representative agent i to other playersstrategies (s) along
the pattern of inventories p(s) for s > t. Then, it must be that
~ i(s;(s);p(s)) =
(
1 if i(s) < 0
0 otherwise.
(4)
for any s  t. Hence, the way the problem has been formulated corresponds to a Markov
decision process in which the representative agent optimizes over a sequence of functions
~ i(t) that allows the ex-post decision on indirect trading to vary with the current state of
the inventory distribution, and the pattern of strategies of other agents.
2.2 Dynamic Nash Equilibrium
Given an initial distribution of inventories p(0) = p0, a Dynamic Nash Equilibrium (DNE)
is a path of strategies (t) together with a distribution of inventories p(t) such that for all
t > 0:
i. p(t) and (t) satisfy the dynamics equations (2) with the initial condition p(0) = p0,
and subject to the constraint (1);
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ii. For all t > 0, every agent maximizes his or her expected utility given the prole
strategies of the rest of the population;
iii ~ i(t;
(t);p(t)) = i (t) for all t > 0.
It is the objective of the next section to explain how to compute a DNE.
The coming section outlines an algorithm that searches for the equilibrium strategies (t)
and for the distribution of assets p(t). The following section will then use it to compute
aggregate time series along the transitional dynamics, and to study the impulse responses
to shocks that a¤ect the matching rate, and asset returns.
3 The Algorithm
An informal description of the algorithm is followed by a more formal presentation. Then
an alternative algorithm is discussed. The algorithm builds directly on the concept of open-
loop Nash equilibrium with many players as in Fudenberg and Levine (1988).7 The idea is
to obtain an equilibrium such that, given the actions of all other players, no player can make
any gain by changing her action. The law of motion of the endogenous multi-dimensional
state variable of the economy, p(t), is a function of the prole of strategies (t), also a
multi-dimensional object, that can change over time in discrete steps. The value functions
Vi;j are the criteria that agents follow to decide their optimal patterns of strategies. These
can be obtained analytically on the steady state, but are di¢ cult to determine analytically
for non steady state equilibria. The algorithm computes the Nash equilibrium policies, and
the distribution of assets iteratively. It uses two properties of the system. First, for any
interesting prole of strategies, the state variable, p(t), converges towards a xed point
(which is not necessarily an Nash equilibrium). Second, along a given pattern of p(t), the
numerical value functions converge to their theoretical values when integrated backward in
7The design of the algorithm is quite di¤erent from others used in the macroeconomic literature. The
main concern of the one proposed by Krussel and Smith (1998) is to nd a parsimonious way of conveying
the essential information of the state of the economy to agents. They assume that agents are boundedly
rational in their perceptions of how the state variables evolves over time but are sophisticated enough so
that the errors that they make because they are not fully rational become negligible. The objective of the
algorithm in Marimon et al. (1998) is to understand under which conditions articial agents operating in
a KW economy follow a predened classier system can select the speculativeequilibrium. The present
algorithm is conceptually close to the one proposed by Pakes and McGuire (1994, 2000), in that it searches
for a policy function in a dynamic environment. But the domain of applications and the type of issues that
the algorithm solves are di¤erent. In particular, the challenge for Pakes and McGuire (1994, 2000) (as much
as for Krussel and Smith, 1998) is to deal with the high-dimensionality of the state variable. In the present
work, the main challenge is nding the initial point of the value functions associated to a particular state of
the economy.
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time. It is then possible to verify whether the value function of a representative agent along
a specic trajectory p(t) is consistent with the prole of strategies that are used to obtain
such a trajectory p(t). The term consistency means that no agent has an incentive to deviate
at any point in time from the designated prole of strategies. The algorithm generates a
sequence of rounds that seeks convergence towards an open-loop Nash equilibrium for p(t)
and (t).
After a brief description of the two properties, the steps of the iterative procedure will
be detailed.
3.1 Convergence to Stationary Distributions
Eq. (2) says that the system of the distribution of assets is given by (the time index is
dropped):
_p1;2 = fp1;3[p2;1(1  2) + p3;1 + p3;2(1  1)]  p1;2p2;31g; (5)
_p2;3 = fp2;1[p3;2(1  3) + p1;2 + p1;3(1  2)]  p2;3p3;12g; (6)
_p3;1 = fp3;2[p1;3(1  1) + p2;3 + p2;1(1  3)]  p3;1p1;23g: (7)
Proposition 1. For seven out of eight time-constant proles of strategies, p(t) converges
to a stationary distribution, from any initial position.8
Proof. See Appendix
Next, the question of which of the stationary distributions is a Nash equilibrium is ex-
plored. Because the answer depends crucially on the relative size of the three groups of
agents, the attention is restricted to an economy in which agents are uniformly distributed.
To prove that a given steady state distribution is a NE, one needs to verify that the sign
of i is consistent with the prole of strategies assumed for that particular steady state
distribution.
Proposition 2. When the population is equally split across the three types, the following
six steady state Nash Equilibria (NE) exist:
8For the prole of strategies (1,1,1), proving that p(t) converges to a xed point is more challenging. But
such prole of strategy happens not to be a steady state Nash equilibrium (see Proposition 2).
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Strategies Assets Distribution Strategies Assets Distribution
(0,1,0) 1
3
[1; 1
2
; 1] (1,1,0) 1
3
[a; b; 1]
(1,0,0) 1
3
[1
2
; 1; 1] (1,0,1) 1
3
[b; 1; a]
(0,0,1) 1
3
[1; 1; 1
2
] (0,1,1) 1
3
[1; a; b]
where a = 1
2
p
2 and b =
p
2  1. In some cases a pair of NE coexist.
Proof. See Technical Appendix.
Table (1) details which of these equilibria exists under every return conguration.
3.2 Reverse Integration
This section examines the dynamic properties of the value functions of the representative
agent i. These properties are important because they will be used by the algorithm to verify
whether a particular distribution of assets and of strategies is an open-loop Nash equilibrium.
According to (4), what matters for representative is decision is only the sign of i. After
some algebra, one obtains that
_i = (i + r)i + !i; (8)
where i  pi;i+2 i(1 i)+pi+1;i+2 i+pi+1;i(1 i+1)+pi+2;i+(pi;i+1i+pi+2;i+1)(1  i) > 0
and !i   [pi+1;ii+1   pi+2;i(1  i+2)]ui + (ri+2   ri+1).
For a given pattern of i the solution ofi can be obtained numerically by integrating (8)
backward in time,9 starting from a neighborhood of the steady state i , where this satises
(i + )

i + !i = 0.
10
It is important to recognize that the distribution of inventories p(t) and the value func-
tions in di¤erences i(t) could be studied together as a whole system. In particular, it is
possible to generate equilibrium trajectories by simply applying the principle of backward
induction as long as the prole of strategies of the population are kept consistent with the
sign ofi(t) at each point in time. The problem with this procedure is that it is hard to build
a trajectory that goes through a designated point in the space of the assetsdistribution. In
models with unidimensional state variable, backward induction works wellat least when
9The mechanism is illustrated in a gure contained in the Technical Appendix.
10See Technical Appendix for details. This technique has been used in di¤erent contexts. Gear and
Kevredikis (2008) explains how it can be applied in more general situations. Pakes and McGuire (1994) and
Pakes and McGuire (2000), develop a reverse integration algorithm for industrial organizationsproblems. In
the context of growth models, Brunner and Strulik (2000) explains the construction of manifolds by means
of backward integration.
9
Table 1: Steady State Equilibria, Strategies, and Money
Returns F S Assets (F) Assets (S) M (F) M (S)
Panel A
R1 r3 < r2 < r1 (0,1,0) (1,1,0) 13 [1;
1
2
; 1] 1
3
[a; b; 1] 1 1,3
R2 r2 < r1 < r3 (1,0,0) (1,0,1) 13 [
1
2
; 1; 1] 1
3
[b; 1; a] 3 2,3
R3 r1 < r3 < r2 (0,0,1) (0,1,1) 13 [1; 1;
1
2
] 1
3
[1; a; b] 2 1,2
Panel B
R4 r2 < r3 < r1 (1,1,0) (1,0,1) 13 [a; b; 1]
1
3
[b; 1; a] 1, 3 2, 3
R5 r3 < r1 < r2 (0,1,1) (1,1,0) 13 [1; a; b]
1
3
[a; b; 1] 1, 2 1, 3
R6 r1 < r2 < r3 (1,0,1) (0,1,1) 13 [b; 1; a]
1
3
[1; a; b] 3, 2 1, 2
- Note: a = 1
2
p
2 and b =
p
2 1. The F and S columns contain the triplet (1; 2;3) that describes
the fundamental and the speculative steady state strategy, respectively. The following two columns
are the assetsstationary distributions: [p1;2; p2;3; p3;1]. The last two columns indicate which asset is
traded indirectly or acts as moneyin the fundamental and speculative equilibrium, respectively.
In rows R1 through R3 the equilibria are unique; only one type of agent plays speculative strategies
in the S equilibrium. In the R4-R6 rows the two equilibria may coexist; two types of agents play
speculative strategies in the S equilibrium.
the dynamics are not cyclical or chaotic because it can be stopped when the state variable
reaches a desired level. But as the dimension of the manifold expands, guiding the system
towards a particular point on the state space (that is on the initial condition) becomes a
hurdle. In fact, if the system has Liapunov exponents of a di¤erent order of magnitudes,
some regions of the manifold cannot even be reached. Conversely, the method proposed here
gives total control on the initial condition, a feature that turns out to be essential for most
interesting macroeconomic experiments.
3.3 Contraction Iteration on the Prole of Strategies
The algorithm sets up an iteration on the prole of strategies (t) and on the distribution
of assets p(t). The value function Vi;j(t) of the representative agents i holding good j
serves as device to update the guess on the prole of strategies, and to determine when the
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algorithm has converged. Since only pure strategies are considered,11 a representative agent
i has a binary choice at each point in time. The algorithm seeks for the convergence of the
representative agent is best response, ~ i(t;(t);p0), to the prole followed by the rest of
individuals of her type i(t). When the representative individual i does not have an interest
in deviating from a strategy that coincides with that followed by the rest of type i agents, a
Dynamic Nash Equilibrium is found. The algorithm works as follows.
Step 1. The distribution of inventories F (p(t)) is integrated forward in time starting
from some p0, under a guess 
(0)(t). The integration is stopped at some time T large enough
so that jF (p(T ))j < 10 6. An obvious initial guess is (0)(t) = ss, where ss is the steady
state Nash prole of strategies. (For some s > s with s su¢ ciently large, one can expect
that ~ i(s) = 
(0)
i (s) for s > s). Let p
(0)(t) be the inventory solution under such a guess.
Step 2. The algorithm computes the best response of a representative agent i, on the
trajectory p(0)(t). His i is computed integrating (8) backward in time, starting from the
initial condition (i(
ss;p(0)(T )), p(0)(T )).12 At the end of this step, one obtains a trajectory
(0)(t), and, more importantly, the corresponding best response ~ (0)i (t) of the representative
agent i.
Step 3. The consistency between (0)i (t) and ~
(0)
i (t) is veried. If these are di¤erent,
~
(0)
i (t) becomes the new guess on the next round, namely 
(1)
i (t) = ~
(0)
i (t), and the procedure
restarts from step one. The method allows the prole of strategies to change at any point
in time.
The iteration is repeated until convergence between (n+1)i (t) and ~
(n)
i (t) is achieved, or
until a maximum number of iterations is reached. If the iteration converges to a xed point,
say p(t) and (t), then p(t) and (t) are the distribution of assets and the trading
strategies, respectively, of a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. The procedure checks that at
such xed point the value function of any agent is at its maximum value, given the action
of the rest of the agents.
3.4 Issues with Convergence, Uniqueness, and Alternative Algo-
rithms
In some instances, after a fast convergence between (n+1)i (t) and ~
(n)
i (t), the algorithm
gets stuck on a cycle that goes back and forth between two close points. This problem is
usually xed by reducing the size of the time step (the hypothesis being that the theoretical
11Kehoe et al. (1993) build cyclycal equilibria in a similar environment under sets of parameters that do
not admit pure strategies equilibria.
12i(
ss;pss) could also be used as initial point. In principle on i(
ss;pss) the system stays still, but
if computed numerically, there is always a small machine error which allows the integration to start. In the
experiments the di¤erence in norm between the two points is smaller than 10 5 when jF (p(t)j < 10 6.
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switch in strategies falls between t and t + 1). In all experiments that started with a time
invariant initial guess for the prole of strategies that corresponds to one of the Nash steady
states, convergence was always obtained in less than ten iterations. The greater the gap
between the initial guess and the steady state Nash strategies, the more it would take the
algorithm to converge and, in some cases, it would fail to do so. For example, if for a
given set of parameters a unique Nash steady state equilibrium of the type (1,1,0) exists,
convergence may not occur with an initial guess (0,0,1). One may speculate that, sometimes,
the iteration does not converge because the system may exhibit dynamics that the algorithm
is not designed to capture, such as chaotic dynamics. Although such a possibility cannot be
ruled out, in absence of indications that the model could in fact produce unusual behavior,
I estimated that it is not convenient to expand the algorithm to pick up trajectories other
then those converging to canonical xed points. The algorithm delivers, however, multiple
dynamic equilibria. In fact, if two steady states coexist (Table 1, Panel B), the economy can
evolve towards either of the two, possibly following a common path for a while.
I conclude by mentioning a variation of the current algorithm. The iteration of the current
algorithm is achieved on the entire path of distribution of strategies, allowing therefore any
number of switches by any type of agents. In environments where only one switch is feasible
or interesting to investigate, an algorithm that seeks convergence over the waiting time
before a type of agents changes her current trading strategies could do just as well. With
such an alternative algorithm, in each round of the iteration there would be a forward
integration of the assets distribution under a guess on the switching time, followed by a
backward integration of the value functions of the representative agent i. At the end of
the round, one would obtain the optimal switching time for the representative agent i her
reaction function that forms the basis for the next guess.
4 Macroeconomic Indices
The dynamics of the economy will be characterized through the behavior of liquidity, pro-
duction, and inequality of income and welfare. A formal denition of these quantities follows.
Liquidity. The model delivers several liquidity indices that are comparable to those
used in empirical macroeconomics. First, the stock of each of the three assets, xi, can be
interpreted as market thickness- a measure of how easy it is to nd an asset on the market.
A second measure of liquidity is the frequency of trade, ti, that measures the number
of times good i is traded in a unit of time. The ratio ti
xi
is sometimes called velocity of
circulation. KW proposes also the level of acceptabilityof an asset in a trade, ai = tioi ; as
an index of liquidity, where oi is the frequency with which good i is o¤ered in a period of
time. The variable ai is, by construction, bounded between zero and one. It captures the
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Table 2: Baseline Parameters
Population Discount Matching Utility Returns
i   ui r1 r2 r3
1
3
0.03 1 1 0.21 0.2 or 0.1 0
- Note: When r2 = 0:2 the economy converges to the fundamental equilibrium, whereas when
r2 = 0:1 it converges to the speculative equilibrium. The steady state capital income share is 0.37
and 0.51, for the fundamental and speculative equilibrium, respectively.
probability that an asset is traded, given that someone o¤ers it.13
Production. It is easier to rst deal with the ow of consumption. Let cids be the fraction
of agents of type i in the overall population that consumes goods between times s and s+ds.
Then, the rate of consumption for type i individuals is
ci = pi;i+1[pi+1;i + pi+2;i i+2] + pi;i+2[pi+1;i(1   i+1) + pi+2;i]:
As production immediately follows consumption, ci, also represents the rate of production
of good i+ 1. Aggregate production is
P
i ici. In steady state, ci = ci+1. Clearly, the level
of ci is a¤ected by the distribution of skills. If a good is produced by a small fraction of the
population, the economy is trapped in a low-production equilibrium.
Income. Since prices are all set to one, the average ow of income generated by agents
of type i holding good i+ 1 and i+ 2 is
gi;i+1 = (pi+1;i + pi+2;ii+2) + ri+1
and
gi;i+2 = (pi+1;i(1  i+1) + pi+2;i) + ri+2;
respectively. One could view ri+1 and ri+2 as capital income, and the rest as labor income.
National income is
P
i
P
j pi;jgi;j.
Inequality. Income and welfare inequality are computed with a Gini coe¢ cient that
measures the area comprised between a 45 line and the Lorenz curve. The population is
split into six income groups according to gi;j, and into six welfare groups on the basis of the
value functions Vi;j.
5 Experiments
This section proposes four experiments on economies of the type listed Panel A of Table
(1), which are characterized by a unique steady state equilibrium. Because the focus is
13The Technical Appendix details how ti, xi, and oi are formally derived.
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Figure 1: Reversal of Fortune
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- Note: For parameters see Table (2). The top-left plot is a partial view of the evolution of the
assetsdistribution of two similar economies that share the same initial condition. The economy
with r2 = 0:1 (0.2) converges to the speculative (fundamental) Nash equilibrium. The curves of
the remaining plots are ratios or di¤erences of the speculative economys time series relative to the
ones of the fundamental economy. The numbers inside the three right plots identify the type of
asset traded.
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on inequality that arises from changes in liquidity, the utility ui is normalized to 1 for all
individuals.
The rst experiment illustrates a case of reversal between two economies that di¤er only
for the level of the rate of return on one of the assets. Starting from the same initial dis-
tribution of assets, a similar set of strategies is adopted for a while in the two economies.
At the beginning of the transition, the national income is larger in the economy endowed
with the high-yield asset. Over time, however, trade intensies relatively more in the econ-
omy endowed with the low-yield asset. As a result, its production expands more rapidly
and national income surpasses that of the other economy. Furthermore, in the low-yield
asset economy, inequality declines because a greater share of income comes from market
interactions.
A second experiment shows that a better matching rate is associated not only with larger
production and income, but also with a more equitable distribution of income.
A third macroeconomic experiment studies the aftermath of a crisis triggered by a neg-
ative shock to an asset return: liquidity and national income drop, and income inequality
shoots up.
A nal experiment deals with a more radical return shock that causes multiple switches
along the adjustment process. The asset with the lowest yield turns into the one with the
highest yield. Along the adjustment process two groups of agents, at di¤erent times, switch
their trading strategies. Consequently, the amplitude and the length of the uctuations are
more pronounced than in the previous experiments.
5.1 Reversal of Fortune over the Transition
Consider two economies that are similar in all respects, except that in one (S-economy),
the return on good 2 is lower than in the other (the F-economy). The returns satisfy
r3 < r2 < r1 in both economies. With the initial distribution of inventories, only good 1 is
used in indirect trading in either economy. Over the transition, as the di¤erence between
p3;1 and p2;1 increases (top-left plot of Fig. (1)), good 3 becomes relatively more marketable
than good 2. In the S-economy, where the good 2 commands a smaller return than in the
F-economy, good 3 emerges as an asset exchanged in indirect trading,14 whereas in the F-
economy it does not. Said di¤erently, in the F-economy, agents 1 choose to get a higher
fraction of their income from hoarding capital. Conversely, in the S-economy, agents are
willing to give up some capital income and to be more active in production.15
14The literature sometimes refers to this phenomenon as the emergence of commodity money.
15Specically, the S-economy converges to the speculative equilibrium  = (1; 1; 0), p = 13 [
1
2
p
2;
p
2  1; 1],
and the F-economy to the fundamental equilibrium  = (0; 1; 0), p = 13 [1,
1
2 ; 1]. The Appendix states the
conditions for the existence of these equilibria.
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Table 3: Reversal of Fortune
Panel A: Fundamental Equilibrium
Bottom/Top Gini Capital Share
Initial Position 0.1840 0.1091 0.3685
Steady State 0 0.1131 0.5074
Panel B: Speculative Equilibrium
Bottom/Top Gini Capital Share
Initial Position 0.1840 0.1235 0.3110
Steady State 0.5283 0.0595 0.3633
- Note: The rst column of Panel A shows the ratio between the bottom and the top income level
at the initial point of the transition and when the economy reaches the fundamental steady state
(see Fig. (1)). For parametersspecication see Table (2). The second and third columns report
the initial and nal values of the Gini index, and of the average capital income share, respectively.
In steady state, the bottom income group consists of type 2 individuals holding good 3. Their
income is zero because they have no immediate prospect of obtaining a consumption good and
have no capital income (r3 = 0). Panel B shows similar data for the economy that converges to
the speculative steady state with r2 = 0:1. (In the initial phase of the transition agents 1 play also
fundamental strategies).
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Except for inequality, the two economies exhibit the similar macroeconomic and nancial
indicators until agents 1 of the S-economy change their strategies. From then on, the S-
economy performs better. Aggregate production is larger, mostly thanks to an expansion in
the production of good 3 (the production of good 1 is relatively smaller for a while in the
S-economy because of a sudden drop in its marketability).
The middle-left graph of Fig. (1) contains the key insight of the experiment: The F-
economy has an initial advantage in terms of income because of the higher returns in asset 2.
Nevertheless, this initial advantage induces F-economys agents 1 to maintain a rent-seeking
behavior (i.e. to play fundamental strategies) whereas, their counterparts in the S-economy,
engage in indirect trading. The reversal emerges gradually as the market thickness and the
frequency of trade of good 3 become signicantly large to compensate agents 1 for the loss
of their rental income.
The crossing between the two economies occurs also with respect to income inequality
(bottom-left graph of Fig. (1)). In the F-economy, the group of type 2 individuals holding
good 3 converges to a zero income. These individuals do not earn any capital rent, and
do not have any immediate prospect of trading their holding against a consumption good.
Conversely, because in the S-economy good 3 is accepted by type 1 agents, the average
income at the lower end is about half of that of the richest group (see Table (3)).
5.2 Market Frictions
The propagation mechanism stirred by an increase in the matching rate, , is now considered.
Assume that the economy is in a steady state. The immediate e¤ect of the shock is a boost
in production and national income, reecting the more frequent trading activity. In the
experiment depicted in Fig. (2) the frequency of trade in assets 2 and 3 doubles when
the matching parameter goes up by 50%. Also the acceptability indices of these two assets
increase substantially. But the shock also a¤ects the distribution of assets, as it causes the
economy to transit from a fundamental to a speculative steady state equilibrium. As a
result, income inequality declines, because the holders of assets 2 and 3 earn a more meager
capital income, relative to asset 1 holders. The top-right plot indicates that the volume of
asset 2 shrinks, for this is partially replaced by asset 3. Since a larger stock of the wealth is
invested in a low-return asset, the fraction of the national income generated by capital return
goes down signicantly, the bottom to top income ratio rises, and the level of inequality is
signicantly reduced (Table (4)).
In sum, a reduction of market frictions not only boosts average income up, but it also
helps to reduce income disparity. Liquidity is, however, adversely a¤ected.
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Figure 2: Market Frictions
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- Note: The pre-shock parameter values are in Table (2) with r2 = 0:1 (fundamental equilibrium).
The shock raises the matching parameter by 50%. The plots of ratios and di¤erences are calculated
with respect to the pre-shock state. The income capital share and inequality measures are reported
in Table (4).
Table 4: Market Frictions
Steady State Bottom/Top Gini Capital Share
F (pre-shock) 0 0.1131 0.5074
S (post-shock) 0.6274 0.0467 0.2757
- Note: The matching technology improves by 50%. The initial set of parameters are depicted in
Table (2), with r2 = 0:2. The economy transits from the fundamental to the speculative steady
state, where trading is more frequent (Fig. (2)).
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Table 5: Higher Return of Asset 2
Steady State Bottom/Top Gini Capital Share
S (pre-shock) 0.5288 0.0594 0.3634
F (post-shock) 0 0.1131 0.5074
- Note: Inequality and capital share variations due to an increase in r2 from 0:1 to 0:2. For
remaining parameters see Table (2). The economy transits from the speculative to the fundamental
equilibrium (Fig. (3)).
5.3 From the Speculative to the Fundamental Equilibrium
Consider now the adjustment process of an economy displaced from its current long-run
equilibrium by a shock that a¤ects the return of one of the three assets. Upon inspecting
Panel A of Table (1), one realizes that equilibria in the congurations R2 and R3 can be
obtained through an appropriate permutation of the R1 equilibria.16
This section proposes an experiment that generates a contemporaneous drop in liquidity
and in national income,17 as well as a rise in income inequality. Imagine that an R1 economy
on a speculative steady state is hit by a shock that widens the return gap between assets
2 and 3. The shock is large enough to alter the long run equilibrium of the economy, but
not the ranking of the rates of return, that remains of R1 type. More precisely, the shock
induces agents 1 to give up indirect trading and to get a larger fraction of their income from
hoarding capital. This more passive strategy has a number of negative consequences for
economys performance. Fig. (3) shows that the frequency of trade and the acceptability
of assets decline. The liquidity drop is associated with a reduction of both national income
and aggregate production. Welfare inequality declines slightly, but there is a substantial
rise in income inequality. By renouncing to indirect trade, type 1 agents hoard asset 2 (see
top-right plot), for longer periods. As asset 2 yields a better return than asset 3, a larger
fraction of agents 1s income is now derived from rents. Therefore, the gap between income
and production is larger after the shock (see left-middle graph of Fig. (3)). Because agents
2 face worse odds in trading away their holdings and they are also the ones that hold mostly
the asset with the lowest return, there is a dramatic drop of the bottom/top income ratio. In
fact, Table (5) indicates that income inequality doubles at the end of the adjustment process
and that the capital income ratio goes up from 36 to 51 percent. The correlation is in line
with Pikettys (2014) argument that a higher interest rate lead to greater capital income and
16The vectors of strategy and of assets for the R2 (R3) conguration can be obtained by shifting one
position backward (forward) the elements of the corresponding R1 vectors.
17Such a correlation has also been investigated in variations of Kiyotaki and Moore (2012). See, for
instance, Aiello (2012), Shi (2012), and Del Negro et al. (2011).
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Figure 3: Higher Return of Asset 2
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- Note: The pre-shock set of parameters are displayed in Table (2), with r2 = 0:1 (speculative
equilibrium). The shock doubles the rate of return on asset 2. The ratios and di¤erences are
calculated with respect to an economy in its speculative Nash steady state.
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Figure 4: Higher Return of Asset 3
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- Note: The initial position is the speculative equilibrium, under R1 conguration. The shock raises
the rate of return of asset 3 above that of the other two assets (r3 goes from 0 to 0.22).
to more inequality. Notice that here the expansion in inequality is induced mostly by the
decline in liquidity (i.e. by rent-seeking behavior). Despite the decline in national income
and liquidity, the middle-left plot of Fig. (3) shows that the average income of type 1 agents
goes substantially up, for it benets from the higher returns of asset 2 a second major
factor contributing to the increased income inequality.
5.4 Transition between Speculative Equilibria: Multiple Switches
When the shock alters the order of the assetsreturns there are broader e¤ects on the agents
strategies. A sudden increase in r3 above both r1 and r2, may induce two groups of agents
to abandon their current strategies. Fig. (4) accounts for such a scenario. An R1 economy
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Table 6: Higher Return of Asset 3
Steady State Bottom/Top Gini Capital Share
S of R1 (pre-shock) 0.5288 0.0594 0.3634
S of R2 (post-shock 0.7358 0.0241 0.4453
- Note: The rate of return of asset 3, r3, increases from 0 to 0:22. The remaining parameters are
reported in Table (2), with r2 = 0:2. The economy transits from the R1 speculative equilibrium
to the R2 speculative equilibrium (Fig. (4)).
(see Table (1)), initially on the speculative steady state (1,1,0), moves, as a result of the
shock, towards an R2 (1,0,1) equilibrium. In the new steady state, type 3 rather than type
1 agents play speculative strategies (although type 1 agents do not change their trading
behavior, indirect trade in the R2 economy actually comes through fundamental strategies).
Inequality has a non monotonic adjustment. First, it goes up, reecting the greater capital
income disparity across groups, and then declines, as the patterns of trade partially level the
playing eld. In particular, the shock and the responses that it triggers make type 1 and type
2 agents better o¤, whereas type 3 are worse o¤. Type 2 agents benet as the return on the
good they produce goes up. Type 1 agents gain from the fact that their production good is
now more liquid, for it is accepted in indirect trading. Conversely, type 3 agents lose from
the shock because their production good is no longer accepted in indirect trading. Overall,
Table (6) shows that the shock rebalances substantially the income levels of the poorest
and richest individuals and slashes the Gini index by half. Contrary to previous examples,
however, this time there is a negative long-run correlation between inequality and capital
share, because the capital windfall goes to type 2 agents that used to face the least favorable
trading odds. Furthermore, liquidity of asset 1 and asset 3 move in opposite directions, a
phenomenon that also contributes to the contraction of inequality.
6 Conclusion and Future Research
This article developed a simple algorithm for computing Dynamic Nash Equilibria for a
class of models where agents with di¤erent skills trade goods in decentralized meetings. The
method exploited a general feature of this class of models: the fact that a dynamical system
describing the evolution of assets can be studied for any interesting (but not necessarily
optimal) policy function, which here takes the form of a prole of trading strategies. The
article then proposed an iterative procedure able to select a prole of strategies that satises
the conditions of an open loop Nash equilibrium.
The algorithm proved exible enough to replicate some of the most common applications
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of dynamic general equilibrium theory with centralized markets, such as shocks to assets
returns, as well as to propose experiments geared towards economies with decentralized
meetings, such as variations in the level of market frictions. The detailed connections between
the policy functions and the behavior of aggregate variables that resulted in the numerical
illustrations could not have been obtained using only analytical methods or by restricting
the focus only to steady state analysis. The applications of the algorithm allowed for the
uncovering of phenomena interesting on their own.
One was an example of reversal of fortune: The initial advantage of an economy endowed
with an asset that fetches a higher return is dissipated over the transition, because of the
limited participation into trading activity. As a result, in the long run it is the society with
a low-return asset that becomes the leading economy. Furthermore, because in this econ-
omy agents trade more intensively, nancial markets are more liquid, and income inequality
declines. An improvement of market frictions can also induce an intensication of trade,
and a reduction in income inequality. More in general, there is a positive correlation between
liquidity and production, and a negative one between liquidity and inequality.
Because the features of the equilibria crucially depend on the ordering of the asset returns,
the consequences are radically di¤erent depending on the magnitude of the shock and on
the type of asset return hit by it. In one experiment, the shock favored the low-return
asset, which also happened to have the lowest level of liquidity. Therefore, in the economy
converged to an equilibrium with greater liquidity and more equal distribution of income.
The simulated economies showed a quite low level of the income Gini index: only between
a quarter and a half of the one reported for the most egalitarian countries. One reason for
such feature is that agents have the same level of productivity. In fact, the only source of
inequality of the model economy is the marketability and the returns of assets. Yet, the
model suggests that inequality originated from capital income is compressed substantially
when assets becomes more liquid, because agents nd it more protable to earn income from
production rather than from hoarding capital.
I conclude with two comments on future work. First, the algorithm generates a converging
sequence of the prole of strategies, suggesting that a contraction is at work. Further research
could investigate the algorithms contraction property starting from some general features of
the value functions and of the system representing the evolution of assets. Second, because
the algorithm is not demanding from a computational point of view, it could be extended
to environments where some of the special assumptions in KW, such as the unit-storage
capacity or the xed terms of trades, are relaxed along the lines, suggested, among others,
by Molico (2006), Lagos and Rocheteau (2008), and Chu and Molico (2010).
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Appendix
Distribution of Inventories (Proposition 1)
For a given prole of strategies the system (5)-(7) converges globally to the unique steady
state reported in the following table:
Strategies Assets Distribution Strategies Assets Distribution
(0,1,0) [1;
21
3+1
; 3] (1,0,1) [p
#
1;2; 2; p
#
3;1]
(1,0,0) [ 13
2+3
; 2; 3] (0,1,1) [1; p
xo
2;3; p
xo
3;2]
(0,0,1) [1; 2;
13
1+2
] (0,0,0) [1; 2; 3]
(1,1,0) [p1;2; p

2;3; 3]
Case (0,1,0). Eq. (5) reduces to _p1;2 = p1;33, implying that the line p1;2 = 1,
is globally attractive (henceforth g.a.). Similarly because Eq. (7) _p3;1 = p3;2[p1;3 + 2],
p3;1 = 3 is g.a.. Finally, along these lines the system collapses to
_p2;3 = (2   p2;3)1   p2;33;
which clearly converges globally to 21
3+1
. In brief, under the prole of strategies (0,1,0) the
distribution of inventories converges globally to the stationary distribution [1;
21
3+1
; 3].
Case (0,0,1) and Case (1,0,0). One can verify that the stationary distribution converges
to [1; 2;
13
1+2
] and [ 13
2+3
; 2; 3], respectively, using the same observations as in the pre-
vious case.
Case (1,1,0). Eq. (7) becomes _p3;1 = 2(3 p3;1). Consequently, 3 = p3;1 is an invariant
set. The Jacobian, J , of the system of the two remaining equations (5) and (6) along the
line 3 = p3;1 is
J = 
"
 (3 + p2;3)  p1;2
(2   p2;3)  (3 + p1;2)
#
:
The determinant is positive and the trace is negative; therefore, both eigenvalues are negative
and the system is globally stable. To nd the stationary distribution, set (5) and (6) to zero.
They yield p1;2 = 13=(3+p2;3) and p1;2 =
3
2=p2;3 1 , respectively. The two lines necessarily
cross once and only once for p2;3 in the interval [0,3]. The xed point is [p

1;2; p

2;3; 3] where
p2;3 =
1
2
[ (1 + 3) +
p
(1 + 3)
2 + 412] and p

1;2 =
13
3+p

2;3
.
Cases (1,0,1) and (0,1,1). A Jacobian with similar properties can be obtained when
the proles of strategies are (1,0,1) or (0,1,1). The xed point with (1,0,1) is [p#1;2; 2; p
#
3;1],
where p#1;2 =
1
2
[ (3 + 2) +
p
(3 + 2)
2 + 431] and p
#
3;1 =
13
p#1;2+2
. Similarly, under
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(0,1,1) the xed point is [1; p
xo
2;3; p
xo
3;2] where p
xo
3;1 =
1
2
[ (2+1)+
p
(2 + 1)
2 + 423] and
pxo2;3 =
12
pxo3;1+1
.
Case (0,0,0). The system converges globally p = [1,2,]. In this stationary state
agents keep their production goods.
When the prole of strategies is (1,1,1) it is more di¢ cult to characterize the properties
of the Jacobian. This turns out not to be a Nash equilibrium, at least when the population
is equally split across types.
Value Functions
Eq. (3) describes Vi;i+1(t). The following does the same for Vi;i+2(t)
Vi;i+2(t) = maxf i(s)gst
Z 1
t
e (s t)fe (s t)([pi+1;i(1  i+1) + pi+2;i](Vi;i+1 + ui)+ (9)
[pi;i+1i + pi+2;i+1](1   i)Vi;i+1
[1  pi+1;i(1  i+1)  pi+2;i   (pi;i+1i + pi+2;i+1)(1   i)]Vi;i+2+
1  e (s t)

ri+2gds;
Time derivatives of eqs. (3) and (9) give
_Vi;i+1 =  ([pi;i+2 i(1  i) + pi+1;i+2 i]Vi;i+2+ (10)
p+ [1  pi;i+2 i(1  i)  pi+1;i+2 i]Vi;i+1+
[pi+1;i + pi+2;ii+2]ui)  ri+1 + (+ )Vi;i+1(s);
_Vi;i+2 =  ([pi+1;i(1  i+1) + pi+2;i](Vi;i+1 + ui) + [pi;i+1i + pi+2;i+1](1   i)Vi;i+1
+ [pi;i+1i + pi+2;i+1](1   i)Vi;i+1+
+ [1  pi+1;i(1  i+1)  pi+2;i   (pi;i+1i + pi+2;i+1)(1   i)]Vi;i+2)+
  ri+2 + (+ )Vi;i+2;
respectively.
The last two expressions can also be written as
_Vi;i+1 =  ([pi;i+2 i(1  i) + pi+1;i+2 i]( i) + Vi;i+1+
[pi+1;i + pi+2;ii+2]ui)  ri+1 + (+ )Vi;i+1(s);
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_Vi;i+2 =  ([pi+1;i(1  i+1) + pi+2;i + [pi;i+1i + pi+2;i+1](1   i)]i + [pi+1;i(1  i+1) + pi+2;i]ui
+ Vi;i+2)  ri+2 + (+ )Vi;i+2;
Subtracting side-by-side we obtain
_i =  ([pi;i+2 i(1  i) + pi+1;i+2 i + pi+1;i(1  i+1) + pi+2;i + (pi;i+1i + pi+2;i+1)(1   i)]( i)+
+i + [pi+1;ii+1   pi+2;i(1  i+2)]ui)  ri+1 + ri+2 + (+ )i
Let
i  pi;i+2 i(1  i) + pi+1;i+2 i + pi+1;i(1  i+1) + pi+2;i + (pi;i+1i + pi+2;i+1)(1   i)
where i  [pi;i+2 i(1  i) + pi+1;i+2 i]. Then the last two di¤erential equations reduce
to:
_i =  ((1  i)i + [pi+1;ii+1   pi+2;i(1  i+2)]ui)  ri+1 + ri+2 + (+ )i; (11)
Since ( + ) > 0, for any given pattern of asset distribution, the system is unstable.
The Technical Appendix explains how this equation is used to verify whether a stationary
distribution of assets is a Nash equilibrium.
An Experiment with Uneven Distribution of Skills
When the assumption that the population is equally split across the three groups is
relaxed, multiple steady state equilibria may emerge (Wright (1995)). For instance, if 3 is
su¢ ciently high, the (1,1,0) Nash equilibrium (high marketability of good 3) may coexist
with (0,0,1).
Fig. (5) illustrates an economy that transits from a (0,0,1) to a (1,1,0) steady state.
The movement is induced by a rise in the returns of stock 1. Although with the pre-shock
set of parameters there are multiple equilibria, after the shock only the (1,1,0) steady state
equilibrium exists. For a su¢ ciently high r1, type 3 agents abandon indirect trading. If
they switch, agents 1 and 2 ip their strategies as well because of the new marketability
conditions. The switch of the three groups of agents actually occurs immediately after the
shock, causing a swift drop in the acceptability of asset 2. This explains the income decline of
type 1 agents. In the (0,0,1) equilibrium, type 2 and type 3 agents play speculative strategies,
whereas type 1 play fundamental strategies. Interestingly, the largest income variation shows
up not immediately after the shock but during the transition. Type 2 agents, by switching
strategy, tend to accumulate more and more of the asset with the highest return. Overall
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Figure 5: Higher Return of Asset 1
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Note - A shock raises the returns of asset 1 by 10%. As a result, the economy moves from the (0,0,1)
(multiple) equilibrium to a (1,1,0) (unique) equilibrium. The population is distributed as follows:
1 = 2 = 1=7 and 3 = 5=7. The rest or the parameters are as in Table (2) with r2 = 0:2.
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production tends to decline because with the new strategies there is less trade. National
income goes up after the shock thanks to the windfall of capital income in favor of asset 1
holders, but then also slides down as a result of the weaker trade in goods 2 and 3.
An Experiment with Model B
Multiple equilibria also emerge when the population is equally split across the three
groups, for the three combinations of returns listed in row R4-R6, in Table (1). When r3 <
r1 < r2, the fundamental equilibrium is (0,1,1), whereas the speculative one is (1,1,0) (type
1 and type 3 agents follow a speculative behavior). The top-left graph of Fig. (6) shows
two alternative paths for the distribution of assets: If agents coordinate on the (1,1,0) steady
state equilibrium, they follow the (1,1,0) prole all along the transition. If, instead, they
coordinate on the (0,1,1) equilibrium, type 1 agents switch strategies along the transition.
The plots in the gure show a substantial di¤erence in macroeconomic time series associated
with the two paths. The speculative pathis associated with lower inequality in income and
welfare. It also exhibits higher national income in the early phase of the transition because
all individuals engage in indirect trade. The three liquidity plots show the greater (smaller)
role of asset 3 (2) in the economy converging to the speculative equilibrium, reecting the
greater (smaller) role in indirect trading.
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Figure 6: Dynamics in Model B
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Note - The rate of return on asset 2 and 3 are 8 and 9 percent, respectively. The remaining
parameters are reported in Table (2). The ratios and di¤erences are taken with respect to the
economy converging to the (1,1,0) fundamental steady state equilibrium.
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Figure 7: Combining Forward and Backward Integration
0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
x 10 -4
p12
p 1
2 
do
t
Forward Integration
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
x 10 -3
D1
D
1 
do
t
Backward Integration
Fixed Point Steady State
Initial point
Note - For parameters see Table (2), with r2 = 0:1. The initial value of p1;2 is 60 percent of its
steady state value. The slope of the right plot is 1(t) +  with ~ 1(t) = 0 and (t) = [0; 1; 0].
The path of p(t) in 1(t) is obtained by integrating the system (5)-(7) forward in time (left plot).
Technical Appendix [Not intended for publication]
Forward and Backward Integration
The right plot of Fig. (7) illustrates a solution of (8) for i = 1 for a particular pattern
of 1: This pattern is obtained by integrating forward in time (5)-(7) starting from some
arbitrary initial p(0), under an exogenous prole of strategies.
Stationary Nash Equilibria (Proposition 2)
The stationary distribution of inventories are derived from (3.1) under the assumption
that 1 = 2 = 3 =
1
3
. The key condition to determine whether a stationary distribution is
a NE is the sign of i. From (11) it follows that i > 0 if
pi+1;ii+1   pi+2;i(1  i+2) > ri+2   ri+1
ui
(12)
Consistency requires that i = 0 (1) with i > 0 (< 0). This section reviews the consistency
conditions (12) for the six rankings listed in Table (1).
R1 ( r3 < r2 < r1). There are two unique NE: (0,1,0) and (1,1,0·). The (0,1,0) equilibrium
requires that
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p2;1   p3;1 > r1   r3
u1
(13)
 p1;2 < r2   r1
u2
; (14)
and
0 >
r2   r1
u3
; (15)
with p2;1 = 13   p2;3, p1;2 = 13 , p2;3 = 16 , and p3;1 = 13 . Conditions (14) and (15) are clearly
veried. From (13) it follows that the (0,1,0) exists if 1
6
> r1 r3
u1
. For the (1,1,0) equilibrium
the stationary distribution is p = 1
3
[a; b; 1]: The above three conditions are replaced by
p2;1   p3;1 < r3   r2
u1
;
0 <
r1   r3
u2
;
and
p1;3 >
r2   r1
u3
;
respectively, with p2;1 = 13   p2;3, p1;2 = a3 , p2;3 = b6 , and p3;1 = 13 . Again, the last
two conditions are obviously satised. The rst condition says that in a NE agents 1 play
speculative if
  b
6
<
r3   r2
u1
.
There are no other NE. A similar proof applies for the combination of cost R2 and R3. A
summary of the outcome follows.
R2 ( r2 < r1 < r3). There are two unique NE: (1,0,0) and (1,0,1). The inequalities
1 < 0 and 2 > 0 are always veried. If p1;3 p2;3 =  16 > r2 r1u3 agents 3 play fundamental
strategies and the NE is (1,0,0). If p1;3   p2;3 =   b3 < r2 r1u3 agents 3 play speculative
strategies and the NE is (1,0,1).
R3 ( r1 < r3 < r2). There are two unique NE: (0,0,1) and (0,1,1). The conditions 1 > 0
and 3 < 0 are always veried. If p3;2   p1;2 > r1 r3u2 agents 2 play fundamental strategies
and the NE is (0,0,1). The condition is  1
6
> r1 r3
u2
. Otherwise, if   b
6
< r1 r3
u2
agents two
play speculative strategies and the equilibrium is (0,1,1).
In the combinations of returns that follow, one fundamental NE always exist. This could
coexist with another equilibrium in which two types of agents play speculative strategies
(multiple equilibria).
R4 ( r2 < r3 < r1). The conditions for the NE (1,1,0) are 1 < 0, 2 < 0, and 3 > 0,
that is
p2;1   p3;1 < r3   r2
u1
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0 <
r1   r3
u2
p1;3 >
r2   r1
u3
with p2;1 = 13(1  b), p3;1 = 13 , and p1;3 = 13(1 a). Because p2;1  p3;1 < 0, the rst condition
from the top is satised. The following one clearly always holds, as r1 > r3. Similarly
r2   r1 < 0 ensures that the last inequality is true. Therefore the (1,1,0) NE exists for any
set of parameters as long as r2 < r3 < r1: Next, the (1,0,1) equilibrium is veried. The
three conditions implied by (12) are now
0 <
r3   r2
u1
p3;2 >
r1   r3
u2
p1;3   p2;3 < r2   r1
u3
with p3;2 = 13(1  a), p1;3 = 13(1  b), and p2;3 = 13 . The top inequality is always veried.
The middle one requires 1
3
(1   a) > r1 r3
u2
. The bottom one requires   b
3
< r2 r1
u3
. In sum,
if 1
3
(1   a) > r1 r3
u2
and   b
3
< r2 r1
u3
agents 2 and agents 3 play speculative strategies. The
(1,0,1) NE exists along with the (1,1,0) NE.
Because the following two cases are qualitatively similar to the one just discussed, the
existence conditions are simply summarized.
R5 (r3 < r1 < r2). The (0,1,1) is the fundamental NE. It exists for any set of parameters
(for which the value functions are non negative). Under the following two conditions it also
exists the (1,1,0) NE:
p2;1   p3;1 > r3   r2
u1
p1;3 >
r2   r1
u3
with p2;1 = 13(1  b), p3;1 = 13 and p1;3 = 13(1  a). The top one requires   b3 > r3 r2u1 and
the bottom one that 1
3
(1  a) > r2 r1
u3
.
R6 (r1 < r2 < r3). The (1,0,1) is the fundamental NE. It exists for any set of parameters
(for which the value functions are non negative). The two conditions for the existence of
(0,1,1) NE (speculative) are:
p2;1 >
r3   r2
u1
p3;2   p1;2 < r1   r3
u2
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with p2;1 = 13(1   a), p3;2 = 13(1   b). With these values the two inequalities become
1
3
(1  a) > r3 r2
u1
and   b
3
< r1 r3
u2
.
Liquidity
This section constructs the indices of market thickness, frequency of trade, and accept-
ability. The market thickness captured by the stock of commodity i on the market at a given
time is
xi(s) = pi+2 + (i+1   pi+1);
for all i. Let oi(s)ds be the probability that good i is o¤ered (but not necessarily traded) on
the market between time s and s+ ds. Then
oi(s) = pi+2[pi+1 + (i   pi) + (pi + i+2   pi+2)i+2]+
(i+1   pi+1)[pi + (i+2   pi+2) + (pi+1 + i   pi)(1  i+1)];
for i = 1; 2; 3.
Let ti(s)ds the probability that good i is traded on the market between time s and s+ds.
Then
ti(s) = fpi+2(i   pi(1  i+2) + i+1pi+1) + (i+1   pi+1)[pi+
(i   pi)(1  i+1) + (i+2   pi+2)(1  i+2)]g:
The velocityof circulation of good i is vi(s) =
ti(s)
xi(s)
. This quantity is not a good indicator
of the moneyness of an object, because, paradoxically, the velocity can be very high even if
it is rarely traded.
Finally, the acceptability of commodity i is
ai(s) =
ti(s)
oi(s)
:
This indicates how willing people are to accept commodity i, once it is being o¤ered.
Numerical Methods
All the programming is done in Matlab. The main running le, called dynamics_KW,
sets the parameters, species the initial distribution of inventories and the initial guess of
the strategies, launches the iteration solution procedure, and generates the plots. The iter-
ation procedure is based on the interaction between two les, triggered within the le dy-
namics_KW: backward_ode_kw89and forward_ode_kw89. The backwardle gives
instructions to integrate the distribution of inventories forward. The resulting distribution
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of inventories (reversed with respect to time) is saved and used as an input for in the back-
wardle. This integrates the value functions using, as initial condition, their steady state
values. The backwardle delivers the three the value functions (in di¤erences) of the rep-
resentative agents i = 1; 2; 3 as well as a prole of strategies. The dynamics_KWle saves
this prole and uses it as new initial guess for the overall population. After each iteration,
the dynamics_KWle computes the di¤erences between vector i (t)and of  i(t). When
no discrepancy is noticed, the iteration is stopped, the resulting trajectory of strategies and
of the assets distribution is recorded as an equilibrium, and all remaining variables (accept-
ability, consumption, etc...) are computed along such a trajectory. In both in the backward
and in the forward les the ordinary di¤erential equations are computed at a xed 0.0001
time-step of a year. The Runge-Kutta approximation method with adjustable steps readily
available in Matlab, is not used because it would require an additional layer of coding to
synchronize the timing in the backward_ode_kw89and forward_ode_kw89le.
37
